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Erasure Proof — signed erasure certificates

When a fact is deleted, GRAFOMEM Cloud can issue an Ed25519-signed erasure certificate: a record that the fact was removed from the memory store, a BLAKE2b-128 digest of what was removed (no content retained), what was observed in each subsystem, and when. Certificates are appended to a hash-chained ledger that can be verified end to end.

What a certificate is — and is not

A certificate is signed evidence that an erasure was performed and what the server observed at that moment. It is tamper-evident (a modified certificate fails signature verification; a modified ledger fails chain verification), not tamper-proof. It is one input to a GDPR Article 17 record, not a compliance verdict.

Two ways a certificate gets issued​

PathWhenContent hashStore check
POST /v1/stores/{id}/deletethe normal deleteserver-observed: the server reads the fact before deleting and hashes what it readread-back after delete; the certificate is refused if the fact is still present
POST /v1/erasure/issueyou deleted the fact some other way and want a certificate after the factcaller-asserted: you pass fact_content, the server hashes it; it cannot check it was the real contentread-back; 409 if the fact is still present

Both paths probe the primary store and record what they found. Subsystems that are not probed are recorded as unverified, never silently as absent.

The delete path​

1. POST /v1/stores/{id}/delete {"ref": 42}
↓
2. Server reads fact 42 (pre-delete content)
↓
3. Backend hard-deletes it
↓
4. Server reads back: still present → HTTP 500, no certificate
↓
5. fact_content_hash = BLAKE2b-128(pre-delete content)
coverage = {"primary": "absent", "decision_trail": "absent" | "unverified", ...}
↓
6. Certificate Ed25519-signed with the platform key, appended to the ledger

Certificate schema​

FieldTypeDescription
certificate_idstringBLAKE2b-128 hex digest
tenant_idstringTenant that requested erasure
fact_refintMemory ref that was deleted
fact_content_hashstringBLAKE2b-128 of the content — server-observed on the delete path, caller-asserted on /issue; null when neither was available
coverageobjectPer-subsystem observation: present, absent, or unverified (not probed)
scrubbed_decision_idsstring[]Decision Trail records whose references were redacted
erasure_requested_atdatetimeWhen erasure was requested
erasure_completed_atdatetimeWhen erasure completed
legal_basisstringe.g. "GDPR Article 17 — Right to Erasure"
requested_bystringdata_subject, dpo, or automated
signaturebase64Ed25519 signature (null when no signing key is configured)
public_keybase64Signer's public key
verifiedbooltrue means signed at issuance. It is not an independent verification — call /verify for that
verification_notestringe.g. "Ed25519-signed at issuance"

The ledger​

Every certificate is appended to the erasure ledger with a sequence number and entry_hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical(entry)). The chain starts at a genesis row. GET /v1/erasure/ledger/verify recomputes the whole chain and reports every break by seq:

{"ok": true, "rows": 26, "problems": []}

A restore-after-backup scrub verifies the chain first and records the result alongside its stats.

Backup-restore independence — still withdrawn (2026-09-10, updated 2026-11-06)

The ledger lives in the same database as the data it records, so a database restore rolls both back together: erasures performed after the backup was taken are not re-applied automatically. The hash chain (added 2026-11-06) makes tampering with or truncating the ledger detectable; it does not make the ledger survive a restore. This notice stays until the ledger is relocated to an independent store.

API reference​

POST /v1/erasure/issue​

Issue a certificate for a fact that has already been deleted. This endpoint does not delete anything.

curl -X POST https://api.grafomem.com/v1/erasure/issue \
-H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"fact_ref": 42,
"fact_content": "Aria lives in Rome",
"requested_by": "data_subject"
}'
ResponseMeaning
200 + certificatefact absent from the primary store; certificate issued
409 {"status":"not_issued","reason":"fact_still_present"}the fact is still there; nothing issued
fact_content is hashed, not stored — and not checked

The server cannot see the deleted content, so the hash on this path records what you said the content was. If you need a server-observed hash, delete through POST /v1/stores/{id}/delete.

GET /v1/erasure/stats​

Totals: certificates, decisions scrubbed, signed count, first/last erasure.

GET /v1/erasure/ledger/verify​

Verify the ledger hash chain. Returns {ok, rows, problems}. A ledger that was never sealed (migration not applied) is reported as not ok.

GET /v1/erasure/{certificate_id}​

Retrieve one certificate.

GET /v1/erasure/{certificate_id}/verify​

Recompute the canonical digest and verify the Ed25519 signature against the stored public key:

{
"valid": true,
"certificate_id": "28b5813a622ed648...",
"detail": "Ed25519 signature verified — certificate is authentic"
}

GET /v1/erasure/fact/{fact_ref}​

Find the certificate for a fact ref.

GET /v1/erasure/​

List the tenant's certificates (paginated).

Configuration​

Certificates are signed only when a signing key is configured. Set a hex-encoded 32-byte Ed25519 seed:

export ERASURE_SIGNING_KEY=$(python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))") # or GRAFOMEM_SIGNING_KEY
grafomem serve -b postgres --db postgresql://...

Without a key, the service issues unsigned certificates (signature: null, verified: false) and the GDPR Art 17 report finding is PARTIAL.

What is not covered​

  • Per-record delete destroys no key: embeddings and content are removed by the backend's hard-delete, not by cryptographic erasure.
  • Subsystems the service does not probe are reported as unverified; a certificate never claims more than was observed.